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PATIENT-THERAPIST SEX: CRIMINALIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Patricia M.L. Illingworth, Ph.D.*
In the most widely referred to study of sexual involvement between
patient and therapist, it was estimated that seven to ten percent of male
and one to three percent of female therapists have had sexual intercourse
with one or more of their patients.'
Most of the patients who have had sex with their therapists are female.2
Sexual relations between doctor and patient are unethical under the Hip-
pocratic oath. Sex between patient and therapist is held unethical by a
number of professional associations, including the American Psychiatric
Association3 and the American Psychological Association.' This Article
examines sexual relations between patient and therapist. For the most
* The author was graduated from York University with a B.A., received a Ph.D.
from the University of California, San Diego and anticipates receiving her J.D. from Bos-
ton University Law School in May, 1995. She will join the faculty of Northeastern Univer-
sity in September, 1995.
I wish to thank Jack Beermann for extensive comments on both the structure and sub-
stance of this article. Paul Wallace's recent death came far too soon. He was very helpful
to me in the initial phase of writing this paper. I am grateful to him for his instructive
comments and for the rigor with which he approached the teaching and study of the crimi-
nal law. I also wish to thank Harold Bursztajn. Dan Harding, Linda Jorgenson, Larry
Strasburger, Tom Gutheil, Karen Walz and Alan Stone for interesting and often lively dis-
cussions on this topic.
I am very happy to have this opportunity to dedicate this paper to Margaret Somerville.
Her pioneering work in the area of law and medicine and in what she calls "transdiscipli-
nary research" has allowed many of us to look at the worlds of law, medicine, and ethics
with a new and illuminating perspective.
1. See Nanette Gartrell et al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a Na-
tional Survey, I: Prevalence 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126, 1128 (1986); see also Judity
Lewis Herman et al.. Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National Survey, II:
Psychiatrists' Attitudes 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 164 (1987).
2. Gartrell et al., supra note 1, at 1128 (88% of patients who had sex with their ther-
apists were female).
3. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 4 (1989).
4. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLO-
GISTS 6(A) (1980).
5. The primary reason for focusing the discussion on patient-therapist sex as opposed
to doctor-patient sex is that the former raises questions having to do with the phenomenon
of transference-which is thought by many to undermine patient consent.
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part, it excludes the most egregious cases of patient-therapist sex in which
the therapist administers drugs to the patient or misrepresents sex with
the therapist as part of the treatment.
Patients harmed by sexual relationships with their therapists have
sought recourse through administrative remedies such as license revoca-
tion, and in the courts through civil malpractice claims and criminal pros-
ecution. This Article focuses on malpractice claims and criminal statutes
that specifically target sex between patient and therapist.6 In particular, I
am concerned with the -question of whether or not patient-therapist sex
should be criminalized. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that
patient-therapist sex should continue to be classified as malpractice. I ar-
gue against criminalization, and show that the two main arguments in
support of criminalization are based on a false and paternalistic picture of




Although some patients who have had sex with their therapists have
sued under a breach of contract theory,7 most actions in connection with
sex between patient and therapist are brought as malpractice actions.
Malpractice requires (1) evidence of a recognized standard in the medical
community and (2) evidence that the physician has negligently departed
from that standard.8 Additionally, as in any, negligence suit, the plaintiff
must show that she has (3) suffered an injury and that (4) the negligent
behavior was the proximate cause of her injury.9 Patients can sue for
compensatory damages for emotional harm and punitive damages for un-
professional conduct. 10 Once a psychiatrist-patient relationship has been
6. 1 shall not discuss administrative remedies because the main controversy is be-
tween civil and criminal remedies. Administrative remedies such as license revocation
generally have been ineffective. In the United States, therapists whose licenses were re-
voked because of sexual misconduct are able, nonetheless, to practice therapy without a
license. Recently, however, Massachusetts passed a bill making it possible to bar a psychi-
atrist from continuing to practice as a psychotherapist, if he or she lost a medical license
due to having sexual relations with a patient. Dolores Kong, Law Closes Psychiatrists'
Loophole, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1995, at 1.
7. Cf. Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
8. See Davis v. Virginian R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 354, 357 (1960).
9. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 30,
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
10. See Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Term 1976).
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established, the doctor is under a duty of care to the patient."
The prohibition against patient-therapist sexual relations has been held
to apply not only to the patient, but also to people related to the patient,
such as the patient's spouse. 12 The ban on patient-therapist sex has also
been held to extend beyond the termination of individual therapy. 3
Therapists, as opposed to obstetricians and gynecologists, are uniquely
held accountable in malpractice actions for sex with a patient because of
a psychiatrist's mishandling of the transference. 14 Roughly, transference
can be defined as "the set of expectations, beliefs, and emotional re-
sponses that the patient brings into the doctor-patient relationship."' 5
"Transference" is a technical term which refers to "the patient's feelings
and behavior toward the analyst that are based on infantile wishes the
patient has toward parents or parental figures."16 These beliefs and feel-
ings, which are often about the therapist, are not based on real facts
about the therapist, but on "persistent experiences the patient has had
with other important authority figures throughout life."' 7
Many courts have held that mishandling transference constitutes gross
negligence or malpractice.' 8 For example, in Zipkin v. Freeman," the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that therapist Dr. Freeman mishandled
the transference of his patient, Mrs. Zipkin.2° Mrs. Zipkin began treat-
ment with Dr. Freeman, a psychiatrist, to relieve persistent diarrhea and
headaches.2' Although these symptoms subsided after about two
months, Dr. Freeman told Mrs. Zipkin that the symptoms would return if
she did not continue treatment.22 Mrs. Zipkin continued her treatment
with Dr. Freeman and experienced a withdrawal from her husband and
11. J. SMITH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PSYCHIATRIC CARE §§ 2.01-.05 (1986).
12. See Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810 (1988) (allowing plaintiffs
action against psychiatrist for sexual relations the psychiatrist had with plaintiff's wife).
13. See Noto v. St. Vincent's Hospital and Medical Ctr., 537 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (Sup.
Ct. 1988), affd, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 1990); see generally Paul S. Appelbaum &
Linda Jorgenson, Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact After Termination of Treatment:
An Analysis and A Proposal, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1466 (1991).
14. ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 199 (1984).
15. HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 2-3 (6th
ed. 1991).
16. Id. at 573.
17. Id. at 3.
18. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986).
19. 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968).
20. See id. at 761.
21. Id. at 755.
22. Id. at 756-57.
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family, and a feeling that she thought of as love for Dr. Freeman.23 In
addition to engaging in sexual relations with Dr. Freedman, she partici-
pated in skating parties, nude swimming parties, and overnight trips with
him. Eventually, Mrs. Zipkin left her husband and moved into an apart-
ment located above Dr. Freeman's office.24
In Roy v. Hartogs,25 Dr. Hartogs, a psychiatrist, engaged in sexual rela-
tions with Ms. Roy after telling her it was part of her treatment.26 The
court held that the psychiatrist-patient relationship imposed a fiduciary
relationship on the doctor. 27 The jury awarded Ms. Roy money damages
because of Dr. Hartogs' "failure to treat the plaintiff with professionally
acceptable procedures., 28 These cases are typical of both the nature of
malpractice claims brought by patients and of the treatment courts give
those claims. Courts tend to treat the mishandling of the transference as
behavior in violation of professional standards.29
2. Insurance and the Ability of Patients to Recover
The psychiatric and psychology communities have conducted extensive
research documenting the harm to patients who have had sexual relations
with their therapists.3" The harms experienced range from an impaired
ability to trust others to an increased risk of suicide.3 There is, then,
potential for large damage awards which insurance companies have at-
tempted to sidestep.32
Establishing that patient-therapist sex constitutes a mishandling of the
transference is important if plaintiffs are to recover damages from insur-
ance companies. Responsibility for abstaining from sexual relations with
a patient must be within the scope of a therapist's professional skills. If
23. Id. at 757.
24. Id. at 757-59.
25. 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (App. Term. 1976).
29. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing cases
in which courts have treated mishandling of the transference as malpractice).
30. See, e.g., Gary C. Hanking et al., Patient-Therapist Sexual Involvement A Review
of Clinical and Research Data, 22 BULL. OF AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 109, 116
(1994).
31. KENNETH S. POPE, THERAPIST-PATIENT SEX SYNDROME: A GUIDE FOR ATrrOR-
NEYS AND SUBSEQUENT THERAPISTS TO ASSESSING DAMAGE, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 39, 40-45 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1989).
32. See generally Linda Jorgenson et al., Therapist-Patient Sexual Exploitation and In-
surance Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 595 (1992).
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the therapist's behavior is not considered a negligent departure from
those skills, the efforts of insurance companies to deny coverage of pa-
tient-therapist sex based on the theory that sexual relations are outside of
professional services would be increasingly successful.33 For example, in
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Mitchell,34 the plaintiff's insur-
ance company tried to refuse coverage because it drew a distinction be-
tween medical malpractice and intentional sexual assault.35 For the most
part, courts have upheld the plaintiff's right to compensation. 36 If, how-
ever, insurance companies are successful in refusing coverage, patients
are often unsuccessful in collecting damages from the doctor.3 7
B. Criminal Actions
1. Rape
Some physicians have been charged and convicted under criminal rape
statutes. This occurred in a situation where patients were drugged as a
means of facilitating sex.38 In another case, a therapist administered elec-
troconvulsive shock treatments on his patients and injections of hypnotic
drugs before having sex with them.39 The defendant was charged, con-
victed, and imprisoned for rape. But rape statutes cover only the most
egregious cases.40 Rape statutes do not cover many cases of sex between
patient and therapist because "rape" is narrowly defined, and the statutes
closely scrutinize victim consent.41
2. Statutes That Specifically Target Patient-Therapist Sex
California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin enacted criminal statutes specifically targeted to proscribe pa-
tient-therapist sex, and impose penalties such as fines and imprisonment
for such conduct.4' Wisconsin's statute is typical of those that criminalize
33. See Denise LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 106 n.113 (1988).
34. 296 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
35. See id.
36. LeBoeuf, supra note 33, at 107.
37. Id. at 107 n.115.
38. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966).
39. STONE, supra note 14, at 195.
40. Id.
41. Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor Over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact:
New Solutions to an Old Problem 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 666 (1991).
42. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (Deering Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
3-405.5 (1994); 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253 (West 1994);
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patient-therapist sex. Consider the following:
(2) Sexual contact prohibited. Any person who is or who holds
himself or herself out to be a therapist and who intentionally has
sexual contact with a patient or client during any ongoing thera-
pist-patient or therapist-client relationship, regardless of
whether it occurs during any treatment, consultation, interview
or examination, is guilty of a Class D felony. Consent is not an
issue in an action under this subsection.4 3
Under these statutes, "therapists" include physicians, psychologists, so-
cial workers, marriage and family therapists, professional counselors,
nurses, chemical dependency counselors, members of the clergy, and any
other people, licensed or not, who are either administering psychotherapy
or who claim to be administering psychotherapy." It follows from the
statutory definition of "therapist" that the prohibition on patient-thera-
pist sex does not apply to all nurses, psychologists, etc. who counsel pa-
tients, but only to those involved in psychotherapy. Given this, the
definition of "psychotherapy" is critical for determining the scope of the
statute. One would expect the definition of "psychotherapy" to narrow
the scope of the provision by specifying the kind of therapy at issue. In-
stead, the following expansive definition of "psychotherapy" is offered,
"(6) 'Psychotherapy' means the use of learning, conditioning methods
and emotional reactions in a professional relationship to assist persons to
modify feelings, attitudes and behaviors which are intellectually, socially
or emotionally maladjustive or ineffectual."45
Two features of this definition should be highlighted. First, the practice
of psychotherapy is not tied to any particular field, such as psychoanaly-
sis. Instead, under this definition, something will qualify as "psychother-
apy" if it is used in a particular way-that is, if it is used to help people
modify their feelings, attitudes, and behavior. Second, it seems clear
from this definition of "psychotherapy" that the patients or clients the
statute targets are not necessarily those who are seriously debilitated by
emotional problems. This broad definition of "psychotherapy" treats as
psychotherapy any activity directed at modifying behavior and feelings,
conducted by a person who makes use of some kind of learning to change
those feelings. In other words, this statute includes within its scope ther-
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344, 609.345 (West Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1
(West 1993); WiscoNs N STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West 1994).
43. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(2) (West 1994).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 455.01(6) (West 1990).
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apy that does not use transference.46 It also protects a wide range of
patients-from those with severe mental health problems to those seek-
ing insight-oriented therapy for the purpose of acquiring self-knowledge.
In the Wisconsin statute, the definition of "sexual contact" includes
"any intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either di-
rectly or through clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the
complainant's or defendant's intimate parts.",47 The definition seems
overly broad because it encompasses behavior ranging from the explicitly
sexual, such as sexual intercourse, to a touching of intimate parts, which
may merely be incidental to an intentional touching, such as a therapist
brushing his arm against the patient's breast as he opens the door.
In Wisconsin, then, any person is guilty of a crime who performs or
claims to be performing a care-taking activity that uses learning, condi-
tioning, and emotional reaction methods in a professional relationship to
help people change their behavior and intentionally touches the intimate
parts of their patients during this relationship. For example, a psychiatrist
with an ongoing patient-therapist relationship in which the psychiatrist
sees the patient in his office for twice-weekly therapy to resolve panic
attacks would be guilty of a crime in Wisconsin if he had sexual relations
with his patient. This is a straightforward case. The psychiatrist is having
sexual contact with someone with whom he is administering psychother-
apy. Consider another scenario: A well-trained therapist who counsels
people, in groups of 200, on how to quit smoking and who has sex with
one of his clients during the course of treatment would also be guilty of a
crime in Wisconsin. Because the statute deems consent irrelevant, the
fact that the client consents here would be irrelevant.
If the second scenario falls under the statute, then the statute is overly
broad. One court, although not a Wisconsin court, stated that "[t]hese
statutes are meant to protect vulnerable persons and allow them to re-
posit trust in those who can help them. The legislature has recognized the
emotional devastation that can result when a psychotherapist takes ad-
vantage of a patient., 48 If the goal of these statutes is to protect the emo-
tionally vulnerable from emotional devastation, then at the very least, the
scenario in which the therapist treats 200 people at one time should fall
outside the statute's scope. The therapist's treatment qualifies as psycho-
therapy as it is broadly defined by the statute, yet there is no reason to
46. See supra notes 16, 17 and accompanying text.,
47. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(5), 940.225(5)(b) (West 1994).
48. State v. Dutton, 450 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
1995]
396 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:389
believe that the person seeking smoking cessation is either particularly
vulnerable (except to the temptations of cigarette smoke) or likely to ex-
perience emotional devastation because of a sexual encounter with the
therapist.
There does not seem to be anything about the person quitting smoking
that makes him or her vulnerable. Moreover, on the basis of the defini-
tion of "psychotherapy" that serves to define who is governed by the stat-
ute, there is nothing about a therapist that would give a therapist the
"power" to make vulnerable someone like the person who wants to stop
smoking. The definition of "psychotherapy" used in the Wisconsin stat-
ute mentions the use of "emotional reactions" as one of the characteris-
tics of psychotherapy. This may be intended to cover transference and
phenomena that resemble it. However, the concept of an "emotional re-
action" is much broader than the technical concept of "transference."
Even if the concept of "transference" could explain why patients could
not consent to a sexual relationship with their therapists, it would not
follow that "emotional reaction" would render the patient similarly
incapable.
If anything can be safely inferred from this statute, it is that those who
promulgated it believed that patient consent either was irrelevant or ab-
sent in a sufficiently high number of cases that it was not worth taking
into account. The promulgators assumed that the concatenation of pa-
tient, therapist, and intimate touching is enough for a crime.
II. EXPLANATIONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS
A. The Inability of Patients to Consent
Many of those who support patient-therapist sex as a basis for malprac-
tice and those who support the criminalization of patient-therapist sex
believe that patients who have sex with their doctors are unable to con-
sent to it. The following is a summary of this position:
[the] patient who becomes involved in such a relationship (in
the vast majority of cases, the patients are women involved with
male therapists) is likely to have a significantly impaired ability
to decide whether to have sexual contact with the therapist.
This impairment may result from two causes: the underlying
distress that brought the patient into treatment, which may con-
tinue to cloud the patient's judgment, and the transference to-
ward the therapist that develops.a9
49. Appelbaum & Jorgenson, supra note 13, at 1469.
Patient- Therapist Sex
Paul S. Appelbaum and Linda Jorgenson claim that a patient's decision to
engage in sexual relations with her therapist is sufficiently undermined by
one of these two factors so as to call into question her capacity to consent.
The following are three arguments that have been marshalled on behalf
of the claim that patients cannot consent to have sexual relations with
their therapists.
1. The Patient's Illness as an Obstacle to Consent
Appelbaum and Jorgenson claimed that the patient's impaired ability
to consent to sex with her therapist is a result of the "underlying distress
that brought the patient into" therapy in the first place.5 The idea seems
to be there is something about the patient's mental health that makes it
impossible for her to give consent to have sex with her therapist. I as-
sume that this impairment to the patient's ability to make decisions about
her sexual life exists only with respect to sexual activity with her thera-
pist; that is, her decisions to have sex with other people are not im-
paired-at least not sufficiently impaired to be prohibited in all cases. 51
Moreover, her decisions about matters, other than sex with her therapist,
are not similarly undermined, even when they concern her therapist.
For example, the recent Guidelines of the Massachusetts Psychiatric So-
ciety articulate an unqualified ban on sexual contact between patient and
therapist.52 They also contain a provision permitting patients to donate
large amounts of money to organizations with which their therapists are
affiliated-although the Guidelines include the caveat that this not be
done without consultation with another physician.53 Under these Guide-
lines, it is only the patient's decision to have sex with her therapist that
the patient is considered unable to make. Decisions to donate large sums
of money to the therapist's favorite institution can be checked to ensure
that they are not coerced.
Apparently the patient's judgment is potentially astute enough that she
is able to decide to enter into protracted and expensive therapy, to do-
nate large sums of money, and to make other major decisions which affect
50. Id.
51. The authors specify that the impaired judgment is with respect to sex with ther-
apists; they do not specify whether there is additional impairment either regarding sex with
other people or regarding other areas, such as finances. See id.
52. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE,
POLICY 94-001 GENERAL GUIDELINES RELATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF BOUNDARIES
IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY BY PHYSICIANS (ADULT PATIENTS) 1994.
53. Id.
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her life and which can benefit the therapist. At the same time, however,
she is thought to suffer from an illness which undermines her capacity to
consent to have sex with her therapist. There is no evidence that patients
who have had sex with their therapists share common qualities. "The
female victims varied widely in occupation, socioeconomic status, and
level of functioning."54 Given the wide variation in the level of function-
ing which patients present, it is difficult to see how one could make any
kind of generalization about the impaired decisionmaking of patients
based simply on the fact that they are in therapy, unless of course, one
subscribed to a biased view of the population who turn to therapists.
Even if there were an illness that targeted the consent-to-sex-with-your-
therapist capacity, it is unlikelythat.it is sufficiently widespread to justify
stating that a substantial number of patients lack the capacity to consent.
Alternatively,: if the assumption is that patients in therapy are more
likely to have compromised decisionmaking abilities than those outside of
therapy, then the assumption is probably false. One interesting study,
although dated, showed that psychiatric symptoms are so prevalent
among community members (most of whom have never been psychiatric
patients) that such symptoms are more normal than not.55 Eighty-one
percent of 1,660 adults in the sample were found to have psychiatric
symptoms; 23% were found to be incapacitated, and a mere 19% were
considered well.56
Patients who seek the assistance of a therapist may in fact have an en-
hanced ability to make decisions. They may be more acutely aware of
their own weaknesses and unconscious motivations than people who have
never participated in psychotherapy. They may reflect more carefully on
their decisions and be more autonomous. Psychotherapy and psychoa-
nalysis are, after all, informed by the values of self-knowledge and au-
thenticity.57 Moreover, if patients in psychotherapy were impaired
decisionmakers at the onset of therapy, there is no reason to believe that
this impairment would continue for any substantial period after therapy
commenced.5 s
To assume that patients have an impaired ability to decide whether to
54. J. WOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THERAPIST SEXUAL MISCONDUCT: A Vic-
TIM'S PERSPECTIVE, Presentation at Boston Psychoanalytic Society (Feb. 10, 1990); see also
Jorgenson et al., supra note 41, at 661-62.
55. LAURENCE R. TANCREDI ET AL., LEGAL ISSuES IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE 28 (1975).
56. Id.
57. See William W. Meissner, Values in the Psychoanalytic Situation, 3 PSYCHOANA-
LYTIC INOUIRY 577 (1983).
58. See William W. Meissner, The Concept of Therapeutic Alliance, 40 J. AM. PSYCHO-
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have sex with their therapists because they are patients seeking mental
health treatment is to fall prey to a prejudicial view about patients in
therapy and to contribute to the stigmatization of people who seek ther-
apy.59 Furthermore, if psychotherapy is associated with social stigma,
people may be reluctant to seek the help of a therapist. Insofar as psy-
chotherapy helps people live healthier, happier, and more productive
lives, there are important public policy reasons for not discouraging peo-
ple from seeking therapy.
2. Transference as an Obstacle to Consent
The second reason that has been advanced for questioning the patient's
capacity to consent to have sex with her therapist relates to the phenome-
non of transference.6 Transference is invoked in order to show that pa-
tients cannot consent to have sex with their therapists, at least, not in the
requisite way. 61
In L.L. v. Medical Protective Co.,62 the court stated:
[A] sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be
viewed separately from the therapeutic relationship that has de-
veloped between them. The transference phenomenon makes it
impossible that the patient will have the same emotional re-
sponse to sexual contact with the therapist that he or she would
have to sexual contact with other persons. 63
A patient in transference 'unconsciously attributes to the psychiatrist
or analyst those feelings which he may have repressed towards his own
parents .... It is through the creation, experiencing and resolution of
these feelings that [the patient] becomes well."' Although transference
may consist of both negative and positive feelings toward the therapist,
the transference at issue in patient-therapist sex is positive transference.
Positive transference occurs when the patient begins to see her thera-
pist as an exceptional person65 and falls "in love" with him. Freud distin-
ANALYTIC ASS'N 1059, 1077 (1992) (discussing how individual autonomy is a marker that
analysis is progressing).
59. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (recognizing in dicta that the
"mentally ill" may be stigmatized by that label).
60. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for a discussion of how transference
also plays a role in malpractice cases.
61. For example, Appelbaum and Jorgenson took this approach. Appelbaum & Jor-
genson, supra note 13, at 1469.
62. 362 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
63. Id. at 178.
64. DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973).
65. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 15, at 573.
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guished transference love by the fact that it takes place in the context of
an analysis and can provide both the analyst and patient with much
needed data about the patient's psychic life.66 Furthermore, because
transference feelings are not founded on the real relationship between
therapist and patient, but rather on the feelings that the patient imputes
to the therapist from her early childhood, it is possible to infer something
about the nature of these early childhoods.67 Roughly, the idea is that
the love that the patient claims to have for the therapist is not really for
the therapist, but it is instead an emotion based on experiences with other
significant people in the patient's life.
Although the term "transference" is a technical term used to designate
phenomena that happen to a patient in the context of therapy, it does not
follow from this that transference does not occur in other contexts. Alan
Stone, for example, notes that transference enters into many relation-
ships, such as student-teacher, lawyer-client, and physician-patient. 68 Ar-
guably, one of the reasons transference occurs so consistently and so
readily in the therapist-patient context is precisely that it happens very
often in any case. By gaining insight into the transference in the thera-
peutic context, the patient can increase her "capacity for gratifying rela-
tionships based on mature and realistic expectations, rather than on
irrational, childhood-derived fantasies.,
69
If transference is present in everyday situations, then it is probably
present in situations where people consent to sexual activity. People fre-
quently consent to sexual activity with others on the basis of fantasies
about the other person, instead of on strictly reality-based considerations.
Consensual sex occurs for a variety of reasons, from those having to do
with the way the others look, dress, and smell, to considerations concern-
ing their skills as a conversationalist. In view of the panoply of reasons
thought legitimate for consent to sex, it would be difficult to argue that
consent to have sex ought to be transference free.
Finally, it is worth remembering that "transference" is a concept spe-
cific to a particular paradigm of human nature, namely, the psychoana-
lytic one. Although that picture of human nature has captured the
66. SIGMUND FREUD, THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSFERENCE 100 (1988).
67. HERMAN NUNBERG, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 245 (1955).
68. STONE, supra note 14, at 196; see also JEFFERSON SINGER & JEROME SINGER,
TRANSFERENCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND DAILY LIFE: IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT MEM-
ORY AND SOCIAL COGNITION IN THE INTERFACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHIATRY
516 (1992).
69. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 15, at 573.
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Twentieth Century imagination, it is nonetheless one paradigm among
others.70  Attempts to take the dramatic step of calling into question a
patient's ability to consent to sex on the basis of it are highly problematic.
Furthermore, given the ubiquitous nature of transference, allowing con-
sent to be undermined by transference in one context may ultimately un-
dermine consent in cases outside the therapy context.7'
3. Power-Dependency Relations
There is yet a third reason that has been advanced in support of the
view that patients cannot consent to have sexual relations with their ther-
apists. Phyllis Coleman has argued that there can be no legally effective
consent to sex in what she calls power-dependency relationships.72 The
power-dependency relationships with which Coleman is concerned are
parent-child, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, clergy-penitent,
attorney-client, and employer-employee.73 Coleman favors liability for
any sexual contact in these relationships on the grounds that consent is
suspect.74 Coleman provides two reasons for questioning the validity of
consent in these cases. First, the dependent person's desire for sex with
the powerful person is rooted in the power relationship instead of the
inherent qualities of the powerful person. Second, the consent may be a
product of implicit or explicit threats.75
Although some of Coleman's analysis is similar to what we have con-
sidered in the first two sections, she provides something we have not seen
thus far. Namely, Coleman articulates a substantive view of "consent-to-
sex." For example, by implication, Coleman tells us that the source of a
sexual desire should be the person himself and not some fantasies pro-
jected onto that person. As background to her theory, Coleman devel-
ops the following view.
When two people are approximately equal in power ... agree-
ment to a sexual relationship... represents a decision that antic-
70. See ADOLPH GRUNBAUM. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1984) (pro-
viding philosophical criticisms of psychanalytic theory). But see Thomas Nagel, Freud's
Permanent Revolution, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 12, 1994, at 34 (responding to
Grunbaum and other critics of Freud). See also STONE, supra note 14.
71. CHARLES BRENNER, PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE AND PSYCHIC CONFLICT 111-
12 (1976).
72. Phyllis. Coleman. Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advan-
tage of the "Fair Sex," 53 ALB. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id.
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ipated benefits outweigh potential injury .... Arguably this
[consent to sex] is a rational decision, similar to a commercial
cost-benefit analysis, where the cost-distress over a failed love
relationship is neither so high as to discourage such voluntary
relationships nor so problematic as to require legal protection
for either party. When there is no significant power imbalance
between them, competent adults should be free to choose their
sexual partners and to assume the risk of potential injury.76
Thus, the background against which Coleman evaluates consent is the
paradigm of the rational consumer undertaking a cost-benefit analysis
before making a major purchase.
It is not entirely clear from Coleman's discussion whether she believes
she is describing the way people in fact consent to have sex in non-power-
dependency relationships, or an ideal to which she believes everyone
ought to aspire. As to the former, her view is obviously false, and as to
the latter, it is not universally shared. Many people, if not most, engage
in sexual relations for reasons other than those connected with cost-bene-
fit analysis. Needless to say, it would have been far easier to slow the
spread of HIV/AIDS were sexual decisions made in the way that Cole-
man suggests.7 A great deal of sexual activity takes place while people
are intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.78
Coleman's view is important because it highlights what may be an un-
spoken, normative value. Namely, decisions to have sex should be auton-
omous in the full-blown sense of the word, and people should not have
sex for impulsive or lustful reasons. The main problem with this view is
that by dictating people's sexuality, it undermines the very values of au-
tonomy and liberty upon which it is founded.
On the basis of my analysis, there are no good reasons to believe that
patients are, in general, unable to consent to have sex with their ther-
apists. Thus, the argument that patient-therapist sex should be criminal-
ized because it is non-consensual sex (rape) fails.
76. Id. at 97 n.13. See also Phyllis Coleman, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Pa-
tient: A Proposal for a "No Harm, No Foul" Rule, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1988).
77. See John L. Martin, AIDS Risk Reduction Recommendations and Sexual Behavior
Patterns Among Gay Men: A Multifactorial Categorical Approach to Assessing Change, 13
HEALTH EDUC. Q. 347 (1986).
78. TOMAS J. PHILLIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF DEATH 82-83
(1993).
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B. The Therapist as a Fiduciary
1. Patient-Therapist Relationship as a Fiduciary Relationship
Suppose, as I have suggested, that it is difficult to justify the assumption
that patients are unable to consent to have sex with their therapists on the
basis of transference and the conditions that bring people to seek ther-
apy. The criminalization of patient-therapist sex has also been justified on
the basis of the idea that the relationship between the patient and thera-
pist is a fiduciary one. Alan Stone takes that view when he says "one can
assume that the psychotherapist has a fiduciary relationship to the patient
.... Violations of fiduciary obligations can be made a crime, not neces-
sarily rape, and they are also relevant to claims of malpractice."79 The
court in Roy v. Hartogs held that the relationship between patient and
therapist is a fiduciary one and treated it akin to the relationship between
a guardian and his ward.8" Similarly, Linda Jorgenson, Rebecca Randles,
and Larry Strassburger believe that a fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween therapist and patient, and that the emotionally vulnerable patient
comes to the therapist whose expertise she relies on to reduce her
suffering.81
2. Fiduciaries Scrutinized: Power and Deference
A fiduciary "relationship arises whenever confidence is reposed on one
side, and domination and influence result on the other., 8 2 Attorney-cli-
ent, guardian-ward, and executor-heir are examples of fiduciary relation-
ships.83 Psychiatrists have recently been added to the community of
fiduciaries.8 A fiduciary has "[a] duty to act for someone else's benefit,
while subordinating85 [his] personal interests to that of the other
person."86
In an extensive analysis of the idea of a "fiduciary," Tamar Frankel
identifies two features which characterize fiduciary relationships.87 First,
79. STONE, supra note 14, at 194.
80. Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
81. Jorgenson et al., supra note 41, at 652.
82. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990).
83. Id.
84. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983).
85. A fiduciary in a relationship such as husband-wife presumably does not have the
duty to subordinate his interests to that of his spouse. Thus it would seem that there are
fiduciary relationships without the subordination of one's interests, although it is not clear
that husband and wife are still considered fiduciaries.
86. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
87. Frankel, supra note 84, at 808.
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the fiduciary serves as a substitute for the entrustor,88 who places his trust
in the fiduciary. 9 Furthermore, both parties in the relationship, as well
as the courts, view the fiduciary as acting as a substitute for the entrus-
tor.9° This is probably more true of the paradigmatic fiduciary relation-
ships. For example, when the guardian of an incompetent ward makes
decisions in the stead of her ward, she is a substitute decisionmaker. An
attorney who represents his client in court, and a stock broker who makes
investment decisions for his client, are also examples of substitute deci-
sionmakers. Moreover, where possible, attorney-client, broker-client,
and guardian-ward understand the fiduciary as a substitute
decisionmaker.
The second feature Frankel identifies as characterizing fiduciary rela-
tionships is a delegation of power from either the entrustor or a third
party to the fiduciary "for the sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to
act effectively." 91 Frankel gives the example of a client transferring his
securities' to his broker and appointing the broker a holder of the securi-
ties. Similarly, a guardian may hold funds for her ward. Where the
power that is delegated to the fiduciary is minor, the act delegating it is
likewise minor.93
3. Problems with Viewing the Patient- Therapist Relationship as a
Fiduciary Relationship
It is clear how traditional fiduciary relationships fit Frankel's frame-
work. Moreover, the framework provides some insight into the power
relations underlying fiduciary relationships. But this conceptual model of
fiduciary relations cannot easily be applied to the relationship between
patient and therapist, especially with respect to either insight-oriented
psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. Because these therapeutic approaches
are informed by the value of individual autonomy, they are at odds with
the dependency values that inform fiduciary relationships. To frame the
relationship between patient and therapist as a fiduciary relationship in
which patients defer to the authority of therapists does not so much set
aside the question of patient consent as it does build the failure of con-
sent into the relationship.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 800.
90. Id. at 808.
91. Id. at 809.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 809 n.49.
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In MacDonald v. Clinger,94 the court held that psychiatrists are fiducia-
ries with respect to confidential information in situations where psychia-
trists disclose confidential information to a patient's spouse. To fit this
into Frankel's framework, we would have to say both that there was a
delegation of power to the psychiatrist, and that the fiduciary is, in some
sense, a substitute actor for the patient. However, there is no sense in
which the psychiatrist serves a substitution role. Ironically, the court's
reaffirmation in MacDonald of the doctor's duty not to disclose confiden-
tial information, although grounded in the idea of a fiduciary relation-
ship, indicates that the doctor is not to act as a substitute. 95
Consider the following scenario: When a physician takes it upon her-
self to disclose private information she is acting as a substitute for the
patient. She is doing what some people might say the patient ought to be
doing. For example, if a therapist, upon hearing from her patient that he
is HIV positive and that he, nonetheless, plans to have sex with his
spouse, discloses that information to the spouse, the therapist arguably is
acting as a substitute for the patient.
After Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,9 6 psychiatrists
have a duty to warn third parties when there is a danger to them. 97 There
is, however, also a wide recognition of the right of the patient to control
the disclosure of confidential' information as they see fit. 98 Underlying
the duty of confidentiality, then, is a recognition that patients have a pri-
vacy right to control information about themselves and that psychiatrists
do not have the legal right to contravene this except in limited cases.99
Although the MacDonald court found that therapists were fiduciaries
with respect to confidential information, it is not clear what "fiduciary"
amounts to here, since the duty to maintain confidences is a duty to re-
frain from exercising power with respect to those confidences and to re-
frain from acting as a substitute for the patient.1"' Under Tarasoff,
psychiatrists have a duty to warn when the patient poses a danger to third
persons; under statutes, psychiatrists can commit patients when they are a
94. 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982).
95. Id. at 805.
96. 529 P.2d 553, 561 (Cal. 1974).
97. Id. at 555.
98. Id. at 560-61.
99. Id. at 561.
100. Thomas G. Gutheil & Glen 0. Gabbard, The Concept of Boundaries in Clinical
Practice: Theoretical and Risk-Management Dimensions, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 188
(1993). The psychiatric concept of a "boundary crossing" shows how highly structured
therapy is and the extent to which therapists avoid acting as substitutes for their patients.
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danger to themselves or others.10 1 In these cases, psychiatrists could be
said to act as a substitute for the patient. These, however, are extraordi-
nary circumstances and are not indicative of the relationship between pa-
tient and therapist.
Now consider the second feature of fiduciary relationships as applied
to psychiatrists: the delegation of power to the psychiatrist. It would
probably be argued that in conveying private information to the psychia-
trist, the patient is delegating power. Frankel defines "power" as "an
ability to make changes that affect the entrustor." 102 An investor, for ex-
ample, may allow his broker to choose his investments. In this way, the
broker undertakes an activity that affects the investor-ultimately, he
makes or loses money for the client. A guardian makes decisions con-
cerning the care or property of a ward who, either because of minority or
incapacity, cannot act on his own.10 3
A similar analysis can be drawn with patients who, for instance, seek
the help of a surgeon. A patient who is unconscious and about to have
surgery has delegated power to the doctor in a way that affects the entrus-
tor-patient. But psychiatrists and their non-medical colleagues have a dif-
ferent role from that of other physicians. Kaplan and Sadock, authors of
a standard text in psychiatry, explain the difference:
In many respects the role of the psychiatrist is different from
that of a nonpsychiatric physician, and yet many patients expect
the same from the psychiatrist as they do from other physicians.
If they expect a doctor to take action, give advice, and prescribe
medication to cure an illness, they may well expect this same
interaction with a psychiatrist and be disappointed or angry if it
does not occur. 1°4
Thus, psychiatrists are unlike non-psychiatric physicians because they do
not tell patients what to do (take action on their behalf) nor, do they give
advice to patients.105 That is, psychiatrists do not perform the kinds of
activities which tend to establish a fiduciary relationship (activities in
which the patient delegates authority) in the medical field. In view of
this, the analysis that is easily applied to some non-psychiatric physicians,
and other fiduciaries, is not as easily applied to psychiatrists and those
101. Tarasoff, 529 P.2d at 561.
102. Frankel, supra note 84, at 809.
103. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of "guardianship").
104. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 15, at 3.
105. Supportive therapy during a crisis is an exception to this general rule of thumb. Id.
at 575.
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nonpsychiatric therapists who practice psychoanalysis, psychoanalytically
informed therapy, and other insight-oriented therapies.
The trend is toward understanding the relationship between patient
and therapist as an alliance, in which patient and therapist work to-
gether.'0 6 In psychoanalysis and its derivatives, patients are active par-
ticipants who disclose private ,thoughts, feelings, and beliefs; and who are
responsible for contributing to the understanding of the material they in-
troduce for discussion during their analysis. 10 7 Moreover, there is varia-
tion in how much individual patients participate depending on at what
stage the therapy is. Consider the following:
The patient moves from a position of looking to the analyst for
guidance or interpretive input to one of taking greater activity
and responsibility for uncovering, sorting out, and integrating
his own psychic experience and analytic productions. The re-
spective roles of analyst [therapist] and patient shift so that they
gradually come to occupy a middle ground in which both con-
tribute, share, and collaboratively process analytic material, and
so gain deepening understanding .... 08
The relationship between patient and analyst is a dynamic one. During
the initial stages of the relationship, the patient may perceive the psychia-
trist as an authority to whom he looks for psychological insight. As the
relationship develops, however, patient and psychiatrist move toward an
equal footing. The values inherent in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic
psychotherapy simply do not fit the paternalism 0 9 that characterizes the
fiduciary. 10
The analogy drawn by the court in Roy v. Hartogs,"'t and underscored
by Alan Stone in Law, Psychiatry, and Morality,112 namely, that the rela-
tionship between therapist and patient is a fiduciary one, akin to the rela-
106. Meissner, supra note 57, at 1059.
107. Id. at 1076.
108. Id. at 1078.
109. I intend the term "paternalism" in the way it has come to be known through the
tradition of John S. Mill; namely, interfering with a person's freedom of action for her own
sake. The idea underlying the fiduciary model of acting for another person for their sake is
paternalistic in this sense.
110. This view of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically informed therapies is not pecu-
liar to Meissner. Consider the following: "I find it useful to define . . . the principal
method of psychoanalysis, as a joint venture in which the patient attempts to express
whatever comes to mind .... and the, analyst, guided by his own associations and formula-
tions, contributes only with the goal of enhancing the expression of the patient's free as-
sociations." ANTON 0. KRIs, FREE ASSOCIATIONs 3 (1982).
111. 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
112. STONE, supra note 14, at 199.
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tionship between a guardian and ward, misconstrues the nature of the
relationship. Patients do not "entrust their body and mind" to a psychia-
trist"1 3 as a bailor entrusts goods to a bailee. Stone realizes that the court
in Hartogs misunderstood the therapist-patient relationship when he sug-
gests that there has been an idealization of the therapist's authority and
that the analogy to the guardian-ward relationship "does not capture the
subtleties of transference." ' 1 4 Nonetheless, Stone explains that the fidu-
ciary model is a way for the court "to say that the psychotherapist has a
duty not to become sexually involved with a patient, even if she maturely
consents."' 1 5 According to Stone, psychotherapists are ascribed this duty
because they have the professional responsibility for "managing the
transference and countertransference."
11 6
For Stone, then, the advantages of the fiduciary model are: (1) it can
explain the duty of therapists to refrain from having sex with their pa-
tients (even those who maturely consent); (2) it can extend the scope of
the duty to refrain from having sex with patients from therapists who are
responsible for managing the transference to all therapists; and, (3) it can
explain both civil and criminal law.' 17 Stone points out that some psycho-
therapists, like behavior therapists (methods of treatment include aver-
sion therapy, relaxation training, etc.) and biological psychiatrists
(treatment with psychopharmacology), deal with patients imperson-
ally, 1 8 and have no more responsibility for managing transference than
does the pilot of a Boeing 747 with respect to his passengers.
The fiduciary model does not succeed (1) because it appears to build
the idea of a compromised decisionmaker into the relationship itself, and
(2) it is not really an advantage at all once you unravel the mystique of
transference. If transference is not the "bugaboo" it has been made out
to be, then the reason for extending responsibility for it to other ther-
apists disappears. Explaining the relevance of civil and criminal law is
not really an advantage if criminal sanctions are wrongly imposed. But
the real problem with applying the fiduciary model to the relationship
between patient and therapist is that it rests on a fictionalized and troub-
ling version of psychotherapy.
113. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 301.






C. Disadvantages of the Fiction of the Therapist as Fiduciary
Although legal fictions are common, they normally serve a beneficial
end having to do with the advancement of justice.119 Here, however, we
have a fictionalized version of the world of patient and therapist. We are
asked to accept the view that psychotherapy is a process in which patients
hand over mind and body to their therapists. 120 Patients, most of whom
are women, have transferred control and self-determination to therapists,
most of whom are men. As the court recognized in Roy v. Hartogs,
"[c]onsent obtained under such circumstances is no consent, and should
stand for naught." 121 The advantages of this fiction are that all ther-
apists, not merely those who endorse some model of transference, can be
held legally responsible for patient-therapist sex, and that fiduciary duties
can generate obligations covered by civil and criminal law.1 22 I have al-
ready explained why these advantages are problematic. I now want to
explain why the fiction itself is troubling.
1. Sexism
There are significant disadvantages to construing the relationship be-
tween patient and therapist as a fiduciary one. First, most of the patients
who seek therapy are women and most of the patients who have sex with
their therapists are women. To characterize the relationship between pa-
tient and therapist as a fiduciary relationship similar to the relationship
between guardian and ward treats women as if they are children-unable
to consent. When a court discusses a patient handing over mind and body
to her therapist, it is difficult not to be reminded of Blackstone's charac-
terization of the relationship between husband and wife. "By marriage
the husband and wife are one person in the law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose
wing, protection and cover, she performs everything.' 12 3
A patient turning over mind and body to her therapist is, for all intents
and purposes, equivalent to a women suspending her existence during
marriage. As this passage from Blackstone shows, this view of women
was deeply embedded in the law and in society. Just how deeply embed-
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (6th ed. 1990).
120. See Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
121. Id. at 299 (citing Graham v. Wallace, 63 N.Y.S. 372, 377 (App. Div. 1900) (refer-
ring to guardian-ward relationship)).
122. STONE, supra note 14, at 194.
123. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (1979).
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ded is the view of a woman as one with her husband in marriage is borne
out by the automatic inclination to view the patient-therapist relationship
as it has been viewed by the courts-despite very clear evidence that
much of psychotherapy involves a great deal of patient self-determina-
tion.124 Hence, one major disadvantage to the framing of the relationship
between patient and therapist in the terms of a fiduciary relationship is
that it burdens women patients with a prejudicial stereotype. 125
2. Biomedical Ethics
Casting the therapist as a fiduciary may also be in conflict with well-
accepted principles of biomedical ethics. The recent history of biomedi-
cal ethics is founded on a principle of respect for patient autonomy.
126
This liberal principle has also found expression in the case law concerning
matters such as informed consent and the right to refuse treatment.
1 27
The case law shows, at least, an appreciation of patient autonomy and
privacy rights. Construing the relationship between patient and therapist
as a fiduciary one, in which patients defer to the authority of their doc-
tors, is a throwback to a time when paternalistic medical practices were
the norm. This is not so today and the trend has been toward ever in-
creasing autonomy.
3. Stigmatizing Patients Seeking Therapy
Portraying the relationship between patient and therapist as one in
which the patient makes the therapist a substitute decisionmaker presents
the risk of placing patients in an unfounded stereotype in which they are
not viewed as self-determining and consequently stigmatized. The fiduci-
ary model of the relationship between therapist and patient may equate
all patients with the most disabled psychiatric patients who are subject to
involuntary commitment. Because most patients who seek the help of a
therapist do not fall into this category, it is a mistake to base the law on
this picture.
124. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 121 (1984)
(using the framework of psychoanalysis to articulate a model for the doctor-patient rela-
tionship which will foster patient self-determination).
125. See Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) (overruling maternal preference in
child custody cases). The trend toward gender neutrality in the law is an example of the
determination of the courts to move away from sexism.
126. See James F. Childress & John C. Fletcher, Respect for Autonomy, HASTINGS CrR.
REP., May-June 1994, at 34.
127. See Cobbs v. Gran, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243 (1972) (discussing duty of doctors to disclose
for patient consent).
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It might be argued that although there are disadvantages to the fiduci-
ary model, the model is nonetheless an important device. It is not in-
tended to give an actual description of the relationship between patient
and therapist, and it permits us to understand why patient consent is irrel-
evant. But I have identified the disadvantages of the fiduciary fiction in
order to underscore the point that the costs of this device are too high. I
have shown that the arguments marshalled to undermine patient consent
are weak. There is no reason to think that a patient's illness will lead to
an impaired ability to consent, and either that transference per se impairs
consent or power-dependency relationships undermine consent. I also
have shown that although casting the patient-therapist relationship as a
fiduciary one can justify the prohibition on sex between patient and ther-
apist and can explain why a patient's consent is irrelevant, it does so at a
high price.
In Patient- Therapist Sexual Relations, Thomas Gutheil tries to save the
fiduciary model by combining it with the concept of "undue influence."' 8
He introduces the latter into the debate because he believes that it "does
not imply that the patient is impaired or incapable of consenting., 12 9 Un-
fortunately, "undue influence" is defined as "[p]ersuasion, pressure, or
influence .. . .that so over powers the dominated party's free will or
judgment that he or she cannot act intelligently., 130 Although I appreci-
ate the effort to liberate the fiduciary model in this way, I do not think
that the concept of "undue influence" is sufficiently free of paternalistic
implications to meet the challenge Dr. Gutheil has set for it.
D. Implications of the Assumption that Patients can Consent
1. Prohibition on Patient-Therapist Sex Maintained
Assume, for the sake of argument, that patients can consent to have
sex with their therapists. Would it follow that it is thereby permissible for
them to do so-or that the law is saddled with condoning this interaction?
I do not think so. In Bunce v. Parkside Lodge of Columbus,131 the court
held that although consent would be a valid defense to the criminal
charge of sexual assault or rape, it is not a defense to a malpractice claim
based on sexual contact. 132
128. Thomas G. Gutheil, Patient-Therapist Sexual Relations, HARv. MED. SCH. MENTAL
HEALTH LETTER, Sept. 1979, at 5.
129. Id. at 6.
130. BLACK'S LAW DiCnONARY 1528 (6th ed. 1990).
131. 596 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
132. Id.
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Maintenance of a malpractice claim does not rely upon the
question of whether Bunce validly consented to the sexual con-
tact but instead upon the possible breach of a duty owed her by
Brown... although consent would be a valid defense to a crimi-
nal charge of sexual assault or rape, consent is not a defense to a
malpractice claim based on sexual contact. Malpractice involves
the breach of a professional duty; where the duty itself is to re-
frain from sexual contact, consent would not excuse the
breach. 33
The following reasoning may underlie this holding. If the therapist is
under a duty to refrain from engaging in non-consensual sex with others
(as is everyone) and under a duty to refrain from engaging in consensual
sex with patients (a duty unique to therapists and some other profession-
als), then consent is irrelevant as to whether or not that duty has been
breached. The Bunce court does not elaborate on what the grounding of
this duty is, but instead refers to the Hartogs discussion of the fiduciary
model and breach of trust.' 34 I have argued that this is the wrong founda-
tion on which to ground the duty of a therapist not to have sexual rela-
tions with his patients.
2. Two Proposals for Consideration
I suggest two alternative explanations for the therapist's duty to refrain
from having sex with his patients. First, the therapist's duty to refrain
from engaging in sexual activity with a patient (both consensual and non-
consensual) can be founded on the professionally honed skill of objectiv-
ity. Psychoanalysts, for example, are required to undergo a personal psy-
choanalysis in part to facilitate objectivity and neutrality toward the
patient.' 35 The importance of objectivity explains why an analyst should
not analyze his or her friends.136  Surely, one can assume that sexual
relations with a patient would undermine the therapist's objectivity, and
in turn, his professional performance. Thus, I suggest that the therapist's
duty to refrain from having sex with his patients, even when it is consen-
sual, can be derived from the professional duty to remain objective.
The skill of remaining objective, like that of managing the transference,
is a professional skill, departures from which could qualify as negligence.
Unlike the skill of managing the transference, however, objectivity is a
133. Id. at 1111.
134. Id.
135. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 15, at 572.
136. Id. at 574.
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skill expected of all therapists and justifies holding all therapists liable for
malpractice when the duty to remain objective is breached. This duty to
remain objective also explains why therapists should avoid acting in self-
interest. If acting in self-interest is a possibility for therapists, then they
risk a conflict of interest which would undermine their objectivity. Fi-
nally, objectivity, and its more normative correlate, impartiality, can ex-
plain the prohibition on sex in professional relationships in general (such
as attorney-client, doctor-patient, and student-teacher).
A second possible grounding for the prohibition on patient-therapist
sex is the professional duty of therapists to manage the countertransfer-
ence. 137 Countertransference is the therapist's counterpart to transfer-
ence. "Countertransference may . . . encompass disproportionately
positive, idealizing, or even eroticized reactions.' 138 To ground the thera-
pist's duty to refrain from having sex with a patient on the duty to man-
age the countertransference avoids the disadvantage of being saddled
with the highly paternalistic implications inherent in the view that ther-
apists are responsible for managing the patient's transference, and it
more accurately reflects the wrong at issue here. The fact is that it is not
the patient's desires, feelings, etc. that have to be managed, but the thera-
pist's countertransference and behavior.
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. To Criminalize or Not to Criminalize
1. Criminalization as an Ethical Question
I have considered the two main arguments in support of criminaliza-
tion. First there is the argument that because patients cannot consent, sex
between patient and therapist is more like rape than consensual sex.
Hence, it ought to be criminalized. I argued that there was no reason to
accept the view that, in general, patients cannot consent to have sex with
their therapists. Then, I looked at the second argument that patient-ther-
apist sex should be criminalized because the relationship between patient
and therapist is a fiduciary one and violations to fiduciary relationships
have, in some cases, been criminalized (as with insider trading). I argued
against understanding the relationship between patient and therapist as a
fiduciary relationship. In this way, I have shown that criminalization is
not justified even on the basis of the criteria of those who support it. This
137. STONE, supra note 14, at 144,.
138. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 15, at 2.
19951
414 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:389
is not to say that I accept either analysis as a correct one of the criteria for
criminalization.
The question of whether or not to criminalize conduct is a moral
one.'3 9 The answer to that question will depend on what moral princi-
ples we select. Jules Coleman and. Jeffrie Murphy argue against what
they call the "absurdly simpleminded" idea that particular conduct is so
"bad" that we pass a criminal law against it. 140 Moreover' the idea that
we criminalize conduct which, as a society, we want to deter, is also prob-
lematic. Presumably, we want to deter all kinds of behavior, that we
would not consider criminalizing. For example, most people are not will-
ing to criminalize jay walking and high-fat diets. Coleman and Murphy
suggest that conduct be criminalized when (1) the private means of pro-
tecting rights is inadequate, and (2) the private means of protection will
work only with the help of criminal sanctions. 14 1 Let us consider these as
applied to patient-therapist sex.
It is not clear what right is being protected in the case of patient-thera-
pist sex. Assume, however, that there is a right to professional services
and that patient-therapist sex violates that right. There is no good reason
to think that malpractice would not be enough to protect this right. Mal-
practice suits carry with them a negative stigma that would have the effect
of discouraging therapists from having sex with patients. Potential repeat
offenders would be discouraged by higher insurance rates which might
ultimately make it too costly for them to practice. Malpractice law should
be adequate to protect the right, compensate patients who have been
harmed, and discourage the activity. Malpractice could also be combined
with administrative remedies that allow for license revocation, and but-
tressed with laws that prevent people from practicing therapy without a
license.
Given this combination of measures, it should not be necessary to in-
voke criminal sanctions as a way of supporting the private remedy of mal-
practice. Moreover, it is worth asking if the cost of using the criminal law
as a way to support private remedies is not too high. At some point,
especially with respect to celebrities and other well-off members of soci-
ety (like doctors), it will just be too costly for them to have their day in
139. The question of what should be criminalized is different from the question of when
do we criminalize. Clearly all kinds of factors would determine when conduct deserves to
be criminalized, including the agenda of special interests groups.
140. See JEFFRIE MURPHY & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO JURISPRUDENCE 117 (1990).
141. Id. at 116.
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court and exercise their right to a trial. If the threat of criminal sanctions
means more to those who have more to lose, then they-although inno-
cent-may be forced to settle and forfeit their right to a trial.
2. Mill's Harm Principle as a Restriction on Criminalization
Freedom and liberty are considered to be a good worth pursuing in our
society. One way to pursue them is to limit the occasions on which the
state can interfere with individual liberty. John Stuart Mill's "harm prin-
ciple" is the criterion used by a liberal state to distinguish occasions when
it is considered morally right to interfere with people's freedom to act as
they please. 4 2 That principle provides that the only time you can inter-
fere with a person's freedom of action is when the action to be interfered
with harms another person and they have not consented to the harm.14 3
Actions which harm only the person who performs them are considered
to be outside of the reach of the criminal law."'
Following this tradition, paternalists are those who believe that it is
permissible to interfere with a person's freedom of action, even when the
action harms only the person who performs it, provided that the interfer-
ence is for that person's own. good. 4 5 Soft paternalists tread a middle
ground and claim that it is permissible for the state to interfere with a
person's self-regarding actions (actions which effect only the person who
performs them) when those actions are not performed autonomously. 146
The criminalization of patient-therapist sex would seem to violate the
harm principle and the importance it places on freedom and the right of
individuals to act as they wish. The liberty of at least two people is inter-
fered with, that of the therapist and that of the patient. Laws which
criminalize patient-therapist sex are worrisome from a liberal perspective
because they interfere with the actions to which adults have freely con-
sented and which harm no one other than those who have consented.
The issue of consent is important on a liberal picture of the "good"
because a person who consents to an activity which is harmful to himself
or herself is thereby prevented from turning to the criminal law for pro-
tection. This same idea is captured in the legal maxim volenti non fit in-
juria which can be translated as "to one who consents no harm is
142. JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING ix (1988).
143. Id.
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done.' 47 Joel Feinberg suggests that we understand the volenti maxim as
not concerned with harms, but with wrongs and injustices. On this inter-
pretation, the maxim means that to one who freely consents to a thing no
wrong is done, no matter how harmful the consequences may be. 1 48 At
the heart of this principle is the right of individuals to perform foolish and
potentially harmful actions without interference. Such a principle is nec-
essary in order to protect a sphere of liberty with respect to actions and
behavior which are self-regarding (effect only the person performing the
action) but harmful to the person who performs the action and to which
the agent consents. At issue here is the right to enter into apparently
destructive arrangements with other people.
One way to look at patient-therapist sex, at least when a patient con-
sents to have sex with her therapist, is as a situation in which the patient
consents to the risk of being harmed by engaging in a sexual relationship
with her therapist. That is, we could look at the relationship as one in
which there is a high probability of harm but one in which there has been
consent on the part of the party who is harmed. Were we to look at cases
in which there was consent by the patient, through the eyes of Mill's harm
principle, combined with the volenti maxim, we would be barred from
holding the therapist criminally responsible for the harm to the patient.
If I am right and there is no generalized grounds for questioning the abil-
ity of patients in therapy to consent, then Mill's harm principle speaks
strongly against the criminalization of patient-therapist sex. Of course,
the harm principle is silent with respect to tort law and contract law. I
have suggested that the question of whether patient-therapist sex should
be criminalized is a moral question to be answered using moral principles.
On the basis of the two principles that I considered, it is clear that pa-
tient-therapist sex ought not to be criminalized.
147. Id. at 100.
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